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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO




If it be true that a "principle" of law, or a "principle" in
the field of the physical or social sciences is "the best that
we know about the subject at any given time",' and if it
be so that "truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market place",2 a study
of the recent developments in the law relating to the
devolution and descent of future interests in Maryland
would seem to be worth while.
"Recent" for the purpose of this discussion means:
during the last twelve years-more particularly, during
the last five and a half years. The "developments" are
those reflected in the decisions of the Maryland Court of
Appeals-especially the decisions beginning with Perkins
v. Iglehart,3 November 1, 1944, which "overruled" Conner
v. Waring,4 decided in 1880. Some thirty-eight cases
relating to future interests have been before the Court of
Appeals since the latter part of 1939. Thirty-two of them
have been decided during the past six years. Of these
thirty-two cases fifteen have been affirmed and seventeen
(about 53%) reversed in whole or in part, dismissed or
remanded for joinder of other parties. The Court has
been unanimous in all of its decisions.
During these past six years no statutes of particular
significance bearing upon the descent and devolution of
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., 1914, Oberlin College; LL.B., 1918,
University of Maryland; Ph.D., 1919, Johns Hopkins University; Lecturer
on Contracts, University of Maryland, School of Law.
t Except where otherwise indicated, all emphasis, in quotations, text and
footnotes, has been supplied by the author.
Address of Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts before the Bar Associa-
tion of Baltimore City, December 10, 1945.
2 This was a key note of the Social and Political Philosophy of the late
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.; McKinnon, The Secret of Mr. Justice
Holme8: An Analysis, 36 American Bar Association Journal 261 (1950).
8183 Md. 520, 39 A. 2d 672 (1944).
'52 Md. 724 (1880).
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future interests have been enacted, but attention has been
focused upon the importance and scope of the Maryland
Wills Act of 19081 and the 1916 Act,6 which changed the
order of descent of real estate. The common law rule that
"seisin or purchase makes the stock of descent"' has been
abolished' as to all future interests which start in course
of descent after the effective date of the 1916 Act. The 1908
Wills Act reversed the common law rule that prevented
a possibility of reverter or a right of entry on condition
'Md. Code (1939), Art. 93, Sec. 332:
"All lands, tenements and hereditaments which might pass by deed,
and which would, in case of the proprietor dying intestate, descend to
or devolve on his or her heirs or other representatives, except estates
tail, and all goods, chattels, monies, rights, credits or personal property
of any kind, which might pass by deed, bill of sale, assignment or de-
livery, and all rights of entry for condition broken, and all rights and
possibilities of reverter shall be subject to be disposed of, transferred
and passed by his or her last will or codicil, and any testator devising
real or personal property subject to a condition or conditions, may de-
vise or bequeath the right of entry or reverter which may arise on
breach of such condition or conditions, under the following restrictions."
'Md. Code (1939), Art. 46, Sec. 1:
"If any person seized of an estate in lands, tenements or heredita-
ments, lying in this State, in fee simple, fee simple conditional, or in
fee tail, general or special, shall die intestate thereof, said lands, tene-
ments or hereditaments shall descend in fee simple to those persons
who, according to the laws of this State now or hereafter in force
relating to the distribution of the personal property of intestates, would
be the distributees to take the surplus personal property of such in-
testate, if he had died, possessed of such, and a resident of this State;
and such heirs shall take in the same proportions as are or shall be
fixed by such laws relating to personal property."
'Unless otherwise stated the words "rule of seisin" will be used In the
text of this study to mean the rule that "seisin or purchase determines the
stock of descent", - that is, "seisina. facit stirpitem". The word "purchase"
as used in this rule refers to taking of title by will, deed or in any manner
other than by descent from a person dying intestate. For a description of
this rule see Reno, Alienability and Transmissibility of Future Interests in
Maryland, 2 Md. Law Rev. 89 (1938). See also Conner v. Waring, supra,
n. 4, 733, stating the rule as follows:
"For while it is an old and well-established principle of the common
law, in nowise affected by our statute regulating the course of descents,
that the heir on whom the reversion is cast, subject to the life estate,
is not so seized as to constitute him the possessio fratris or stirps of
descent, if he died during the existence of the life estate, and that the
person claiming as heir must claim from a previous ancestor last actu-
ally seized of the inheritance .... ; yet, while the estate is thus in
ezpectancy, the intermediate heir, In whom the reversion may vest,
may do acts, which the law deems equivalent to an actual seisin, and
which will change the course of the descent, and make a new root of
inheritance. Thus, he may by exercising acts of ownership over it, as
by granting it for life, or in tail; or by devising it, or changing it,
appropriate it to himself, and by that means change the course of
descent."
'Perkins v. Iglehart, supra, n. 3; Hammond v. Piper, 185 Md. 314, 44 A.
2d 756 (1945) ; Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 58 A. 2d 649 (1948).
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broken from being transmitted by the will of any one, and
for the first time made it possible under Maryland law to
dispose of such future interests by testamentary disposi-
tion.
The rule of seisin has been interpreted-both with and
without the help of the above mentioned Maryland stat-
utes - in a manner that removes many of the limitations
on the intermediate heir's power to control the devolution
and descent of a future interest which came into existence
before the Act of 1916.
Many future interests which, prior to the decision in
Perkins v. Iglehart,9 were considered "possibilities of re-
verter" are now clearly held to be reversions or equitable
reversions-both vested estates-and the descent and
devolution of vested future estates-reversions and vested
remainders-were not affected by the 1908 Wills Act and
the 1916 Act relating to descents. Their course of descent
is the same both before and since those Acts, irrespective of
the time of their origin. The contingent remainder to a
designated person is the principal future interest whose
devolution and descent is affected by these Acts. Neither
statute affected the course of descent of contingent gifts
to a class of undesignated persons, since class remainders
contingent only as to persans to take when the estate falls
into possession, become vested remainders to designated
individuals as soon as a person comes into being answering
the class description; and class remainders contingent both
as to the persons to take and the event upon which the
estate will become either a vested future estate or a posses-
sory one, or both, are not affected by the 1908 and 1916
Acts. Neither of those Acts changed the rules of construc-
tion, which are themselves, to a large extent, rules of law,
which determine whether a remainder is or is not one to a
class with an express or implied condition of survival. The
rules of construction are the same whether the future in-




Until the passage of the 1908 Act no intermediate heir
of a possibility of reverter or a right of entry on condition
broken, could control its devolution. By its interpretation
of that Act the Court of Appeals has held that any inter-
mediate heir who is living after the effective date of the
Act can by his will control the devolution of such estates."°
The Court in so interpreting the Act states" that it is not
giving it retroactive effect, but the result of its interpreta-
tion is to permit a change, under the guise of a subse-
quently enacted statute, of the rules relating to devolution
and descent of such a future interest, which were in force
at the time of the death of a testator prior to the enactment
of the statute.
Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, as well as
executory devises and contingent remainders created since
the 1916 Act, will, like vested remainders and reversions,
descend and devolve in the same manner as personal prop-
erty under the Maryland statutes relating to descent and
distribution in intestacy, free of the common law rule of
seisin, and subject to the rights of any intermediate heir
to control their descent and devolution by will.
THE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION FOLLOWED
By THE COURT
The Maryland Court of Appeals has recently indicated
in general terms the point of view from which it expresses
the law of any particular case. In denying a motion to
clarify an opinion the Court, in Weiprecht v. Gill,2 a case
not involving future interests, said:
"This Court endeavors not only to state correctly
the law as applicable to the facts of the case, but also
to avoid misleading statement which may unsettle
settled law .... Litigants and lawyers, may not un-
reasonably be expected to indulge the presumption
that a correct statement of law applicable to a case
carries no lurking intention to unsettle questions long
"Perkins v. Iglehart, ibid.; Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., supra, n. 8,
cited in Ringgold v. Arnold, The Baltimore Daily Record, November 16, 1950.
, Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., ibid.
"62 A. 2d 253 (1948), motion to clarify denied, 63 A, 2d 311, 312 (1948).
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ago decided and not raised or to overrule a number of
cases not mentioned. If we should undertake to render
advisory opinions to allay farfetched doubts and fears
of title companies, such a practice, necessarily ex
parte, would increase rather than diminish the risk
of error on our part."
In the recent case of Fletcher v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co.,1" the court made the following statement:
"In argument it seems to be suggested that deci-
sions of this court are not 'applicable retroactively'.
Such a suggestion is groundless. Whatever philosophy
or language may have gained in the expression 'judge-
made law', courts which by overruling their own de-
cisions have done most to give the expression meaning
usually adhere, with relentless logic, to the orthodox
theory that courts 'declare' the law as it has been from
the beginning. 'Judge-made law' has no date of en-
actment. Rules of construction and constitutional
limitations against retroactive legislation are not ap-
plicable to judicial decisions. Real or apparent ex-
ceptions to these principles (e. g., provisions in tax
statutes for non-retroactive administrative rulings)
are not now material. This court has never departed
from these principles."
The primary task of the Court when a case involving a
future interest comes before it, is, as it has always been,
to determine by the application of the well-settled rules
of construction what kind of a future interest is involved,
and then to apply the rules of law in force at the time the
estate originated to determine who owns it,-that is, to
determine its course of descent and devolution. If it de-
cides that a contingent remainder to a designated person is
involved, or a possibility of reverter, right of entry on con-
dition broken, or an executory devise (for these are the
future interests whose courses of descent are affected by the
1908 and 1916 Acts), the next matter of importance to be
decided is the time when it came into existence: if before
the 1916 Act, the old common law rule of seisin (as there-
tofore interpreted and applied in Maryland) controls, and
'67 A. 2d 386, 390 (1949).
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excludes the intermediate heir from casting descent to
his own heirs; if after 1916, that restrictive rule does not
apply.
THE RULE OF SEISIN, AND CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
CREATED BEFORE 1916
In its decision in Hammond v. Piper,4 the Court, in a
case involving a contingent remainder to designated per-
sons, said:
"The ancient doctrine that seizin determines the
stock of descent, as applied in the case of Conner v.
Waring,... Was discussed by this Court in the recent
case of Perkins v. Iglehart .... It was there held that
the doctrine was abolished by statutory enactment
(Ch. 325, Acts of 1916), by which descent of real prop-
erty now follows the course of distribution of personal
property. The Court, speaking through Chief Judge
Marbury, said: 'There is no common law of seizin
making the stock. The descent is by the Maryland
law of inheritance and distribution'."
That case involved a contingent remainder to a desig-
nated contingent remainderman created by the will of a
testator who died in 1908. The contingent remainderman
died intestate in 1918 and her intermediate heir died testate
in 1943, predeceasing the life tenant, whose death in 1944
marked the happening of the contingent event upon which
the estate became a vested estate falling into possession.
The Court held that since the contingent remainder was
created by a will which became effective before the 1916
Act, the will of a deceased intermediate heir of the con-
tingent remainderman, who had died intestate after the
1916 Act, could not affect its descent to the persons in being
at the time of the happening of the contingent event in
1944, who could qualify and "make themselves heirs" of
the intestate contingent remainderman. The Court said
in this case-although in part by way of dictum: 5
"The rule announced by Mr. Justice Story in the
Barnitz case is not identical with the rule of Conner v.
"Supra, n. 8, 320.
Ibid.
[VOL. XI
19501 FUTURE INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS 193
Waring, but was adopted by analogy. Nevertheless,
when the latter was abolished by statute, the analogy
must fail, and neither rule could properly be applied
to exclude intermediate heirs claiming under wills
taking effect since the adoption of this statute."
"The difficulty in the case at bar is that the will
took effect before the passage of that Act. It was not
retroactive, Kernan v. Carter, 132 Md. 577, 586, 104 A.
530. We are not prepared, in the case of the will before
us, to overrule the line of Maryland cases establishing
the rule, however anomolous it may be."
THE RuLE OF SEISm: STATEMENT OF THE RuLE
In its decision in Perkins v. Iglehart,16 which involved
the devolution of a reversion which resulted from an in-
testacy by reason of a remainder void because in violation
of the rule against perpetuities, the Court, had said with
respect to the descent of future interests under the com-
mon law rule:
"This was based upon the old 6ommon law rule
with respect to real estate known as seisina facit
stirpitem. This was in effect that before an heir could
actually make himself the stock of descent, and make
hereditaments transmissible to his own heirs, he must
be actually seized of the property in law or in deed,
and 'if he die before entry or other actual seisin or
possession obtained, the brother of the half blood shall
succeed to the inheritance in exclusion of the sister of
the whole; as the person now claiming must make him-
self heir to him who was last actually seized by entry,
receipt of rent, presentation to advowson, etc., or to
the original purchaser or mesne grantor as the case
may require.' Watkins' Essay on the Law of Descents,
4th Edition, Chapter 1, page 50. If, however, the heir
did obtain possession, that changed the stock of
descent, and the sister of the whole blood became his
heir. This resulted in the maxim possessio fratris facit
sororem esse haeredem. The doctrine of seisin was un-
satisfactory when applied to future interests, because
as long as an interest was future and not possessory,
there could be no seisin in the owner. The early Eng-
16 Supra, n. 3, 540-1.
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lish cases, therefore, adopted a doctrine that the last
purchaser of a future interest could cast a descent to
his heirs. From this arose the situation that as a future
interest was not descendible it would not pass to the
heirs of the owner, but would pass to the heirs of his
grantee who would thereby become a purchaser. That
was the situation which existed when Conner v.
Waring was decided. . . . This Court in Conner v.
Waring held that the intermediate heir, in this case
Louisa, could not cast a descent by her will because
she had only a benelicial interest, the legal interest
being in the trustees.'
THE RULE "ANALOGOUS" TO THE RULE OF SEISIN
The rule referred to in Barnitz v. Casey,'17 was developed
by way of analogy to the rule that seisin determines the
stock of descent, and is discussed with particular reference
to the common law rule as to transmission of contingent
remainders and executory devises as follows:"'
"And it seems very clear, that at common law, con-
tingent remainders and executory devises are trans-
missible to the heirs of the party to whom they are
limited, if he chance to die before the contingency
happens. Pollexfen, 54; 1 Co. 99; Cas. Temp. Talb.,
117. In such case, however, it does not vest absolutely
in the first heir, so as, upon his death, to carry it to
his heir at law, who is not heir at law of the first dev-
isee, but it devolves from heir to heir, and vests abso-
lutely in him only who can make himself heir to the
first devisee, at the time when the contingency hap-
pens, and the executory devise falls into possession... ".
"Nor does it vary the legal result, that the person to
whom the preceding estate is devised, happens to be
the heir of the executory devisee, for though, on the
death of the latter, the executory devise devolves upon
him, yet it is not merged in the preceding estate, but
expects the regular happening of the contingency, and
then vests absolutely in the then heir of the executory
devisee."
177 Cranch. 456 (U. S. 1813).
,
8 Ibid., 469, 470.
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The comment is then made by the court that this rule
was adopted "in analogy to" the doctrine of possessio fratis
which was stated as follows:19
"This rule is adopted, in analogy to that rule of
descent which requires that a person who claims a fee
simple, by descent from one who was first purchaser of
the reversion or remainder expectant on a free-hold
estate, must make himself heir of such purchaser at
the time when that reversion or remainder falls into
possession."
A leading case, and one of the earliest on the subject of
transmissibility of contingent remainders and executory
devises, is Buck v. Lantz,20 which recognizes and applies the
rule of Barnitz v. Casey," and there are several later cases
dealing with the same subject.22 In Hammond v. Piper,23
the court's comment on the rule of seisin and the analogous
rule was as follows:
"Where the remaindermen are ascertained, although
there is contingency as to an event, such as the death
of Raleigh without leaving children or descendants,
such remainders are both descendable and devisable.
4 Kent's Com. 261; Fearne, Cont. Rem. 371. It is per-
fectly clear that the interest of Willie 0. Piper passed
under his will to his widow, Ida, for life, with remainder
to his daughter Mary, and the interest of Elmer E.
Piper passed under his will to his widow, Sadie V.
Piper.... But since Annie K. Hammond died intestate,
it becomes necessary to determine whether her interest
passed to her heirs or distributees living at the time of
her death, or to her heirs and distributees in esse at the
time of the falling-in of the life estate. Under the rule
laid down in the Restatement, Property, Sec. 164, her
interest would pass to her heirs living at the time of her
death, but on this point the Maryland authorities are
to the contrary. See Miller, Construction of Wills, Sec-
tion 235."
- Ibid., 470.
49 Md. 439 (1878).
2Supra, n. 17.
See Garrison v. Hill, 79 Md. 75, 81-82, 28 A. 1062 (1894) ; Lee v. O'Don-
nell, 95 Md. 538, 547, 52 A. 979 (1902) ; Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 71
A. 999 (1909) ; Jenkins v. Bonsal, 116 Md. 629, 82 A. 229 (1911).
" Supra, n. 8, 819.
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The Court then quoted with approval from Barnitz v.
Casey,24 and said the rule laid down has been consist-
ently followed in Maryland and even applied to personal
property.
THE RULE OF SEISIN AS APPLIED IN
CONNER V. WARNG
The Court in Perkins v. Iglehart,25 after stating the com-
mon law rule of seisin, then went on to point out that the
reason given by the Court in Conner v. Waring26 for its
conclusion that the intermediate heir could not control the
descent by her will because "she had only a beneficial in-
terest, the legal interest being in the trustees" was in error;
and further emphasized that fact in Evans v. Safe Deposit
and Trust Company27 by stating with reference to Conner
v. Waring:
"In Conner v. Waring and Hammond v. Piper, as in
Marbury v. Bouse, there were valid contingent re-
mainders in fee to issue after life estates; in Perkins v.
Iglehart there were no valid remainders to issue but
two successive equitable life estates, the second to a
son's widow, who might possibly be a person not in esse
at the death of the testatrix. Since Conner v. Waring
and before the three recent cases above cited this court
has repeatedly recognized undisposed of interests, in
estates held by trustees in fee, as equitable reversions,
alienable, devisable and also descendable from heir to
heir, not subject to the rule seisina facit stirpitem....
In Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md. 428, 438, 439, 144 A.
367, it was held that the common law rules as to seisin
are not applicable to equitable estates (in that case,
an equitable remainder), since the seisin is in the
trustees."
As to the conclusion in Conner v. Waring that the future
interest there involved was a "right of reverter" the Court
2S upra, circa, ns. 17-19.
Supra, n. 3.
1 Supra, n. 4.
21 Supra, n. 8, 654.
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in the Evans case said that such an interpretation was also
in error, stating that the future interest was an "equitable
reversion", which, though it dropped back "by way of re-
verter", was nevertheless a reversion. The Court in the
Evans case said:2
"In Conner v. Waring, 52 Md. 724, 734, it was held
that, notwithstanding the rule seisina facit stirpitem,
the original owner or the intermediate heirs of a re-
version can alien or devise it, thereby creating a new
stirps of descent. It was, however, also said that the
devise there in question, 'when taken in connection
with other portions of the will as manifesting the in-
tent, clearly vested the legal fee in the trustees and the
heirs of the survivor; but it was a determinable fee, and,
consequently, as soon as the death of the equitable life
tenant occurred, without having had issue to take the
remainder, that event defeated and determined the
estate in law conferred upon the trustees, and it be-
came then vested, by way of reverter, in the heirs-at-
law of the original donor of the power.' Whether the
'undisposed of property' was an equitable reversion was
not considered, evidently because the appellant did not
ask such a construction of the wills in question but
asserted only her title at. law and contended that the
reversionary interest (a) was a possibility of reverter
and (b) as such, was devisable. This court accepted the
appellant's premise and rejected her conclusion. If the
premise had been disputed, no prior or subsequent case
would now support it. In the case at bar appellants
refer to Mr. Gray's discussion of Conner v. Waring, in
which he remarked that 'the trustees had a fee simple
absolute, which, on the contingency that had occurred,
they held subject to a resulting trust in favor of the
testator's heirs', and that 'the heirs were undoubtedly
entitled, but it was under a resulting trust and not by
possibility of reverter.' Gray, Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, 4th Ed., sec. 40.9. The resulting trust arises with
respect to the equitable reversion."
The Court had expressed the same view of Conner v.
Waring in the case of Perkins v. Iglehart29 where it said, in
Ibid., 654-M.Supra, n. 3, 542,543.
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speaking of a legal estate vested in a trustee for certain
life estates only:
"There is a distinct difference between the estate
considered in Conner v. Waring and Mrs. Dun's estate
which is now before us. In Conner v. Waring there was
a devise in trust to Louisa Torrance for her natural life.
After the death of Louisa there was an absolute devise
to her children. These devises of a life estate in trust
and a fee simple estate over to the children, were good.
The void devise was the clause which provided for a
fee simple estate over to the survivors of the children
of the testatrix in the event of the decease of Louisa
without leaving any child or children or descendants.
On this will Judge Alvey, delivering the opinion of the
Court in Conner v. Waring, said the trustees had the
legal fee 'but it was a determinable fee, and, conse-
quently, as soon as the death of the equitable life tenant
occurred, without having had issue to take the re-
mainder, that event defeated and determined the estate
in law conferred upon the trustees, and became thence
vested, by way of reverter, in the heirs-at-law of the
original donor of the power.' In the case before us we
have a legal estate vested in the trustee for the life of
the son, and then, as to the one-third, for the unmarried
life of the widow. These were all of the bequests that
were good. They could not, in any event, extend be-
yond the unmarried life of the widow. The estate was
not a fee, determinable on the happening of a con-
tingency which might divest the fee simple title of the
trustee and put it in other persons as was the case of
Conner v. Waring. The estates, in the case before us,
after the determination of the two life estates, were
void ab initio, because of the violation of the rule
against perpetuities. The trustee, therefore, did not
hold a determinable fee, or since we are speaking of
personal property, it did not hold an absolute legal
estate, subject to be divested. It held absolute legal
title to the estate during the two beneficial life estates,
after which there was no further valid grant, and there-
fore, there existed in the heir of the testatrix, from her
death, not a possibility of a reverter, but an absolute
reversion."
[VOL. XI
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DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSSIBILITY OF REvERTER
AND A REvERTR
The Court in Perkins v. Iglehart° quotes with approval
the classification of reversions as set out in the Restatement
of The Law of Property, thus:
"The classification of reversions is set out in Restate-
ment of the Law, Property, Part I, paragraph 154e,
where it is stated: 'Sometimes reversionary interests
are indefeasibly vested, as, for example, when A having
complete property in a thing, transfers an interest
therein, measured in duration by the life of the trans-
feree. Sometimes a reversionary interest is defeasibly
vested, as for example, when a transferor who has an
estate in fee simple absolute, transfers an estate for
life, plus a remainder in fee simple absolute, subject to
a condition precedent .... Sometimes a reversionary
interest is subject to a condition precedent, as for ex-
ample when the created interests can exhaust the full
interest had by the transferor prior to his transfer, but
upon the occurrence of a stipulated event, will sooner
end, leaving a balance to be enjoyed by the original
transferor. Reversionary interests of the first two types
are designated reversions, while reversionary inter-
ests of the third type are designated possibilities of
reverter'."
It then applied them to the facts of the case, saying:
"The reversion in the present case is according to
the above definitions 'indefeasibly vested'. We, there-
fore, have here an absolute estate in the trustee for the
duration of the life of the son and for the duration of
t7e unmarried life of the widow, and then an indefea-
sibly vested reversion in the heir of the testatrix at the
time of her death. That is the effect of an intestacy
caused by a void bequest."
Marbury v. Bouse,3 ' is quoted in the Evans case,"2 with
further reference to Conner v. Waring as bearing upon the
- Ibid., 543-544.
-1187 Md. 106,48 A. 2d 582, 166 A. L. R. 1272 (1946).
81Supra, n. 8, 654.
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distinction between a right of reverter and a reversion, as
follows:
"In Marbury v. Bouse, 187 Md. 106, 48 A. 2d 582, 585,
166 A.L.R. 1272, a testator left the residue of his estate
in trust for his wife for life, then for named children
for life, with remainders to the issue, if any, of each
child, otherwise to the survivors. Upon the death of
the last survivor without issue there was partial in-
testacy. We said, 'We are here dealing with an absolute
reversion and not a mere possibility of reverter, as in
Conner v. Waring, 52 Md. 724. The distinction was fully
recognized in Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 542, 39
A. 2d 672, although the decision in that case was also
based upon statutory changes in the law of inheritance
and distribution antedating the execution of the will.
In Hammond v. Piper (185) Md. (314), 44 A. 2d 756,
and in the other cases there cited, it was held that the
rule of Conner v. Waring was applicable by way of
analogy to contingent remainders as well as executory
devises, in the case of wills taking effect prior to the
statutory changes above mentioned. But it was inti-
mated that intermediate heirs would not have been ex-
cluded, had there been an intestacy'."
DEScENT OF EQUITABLE REVERSIONS
The passage from the Evans33 case, quoted herein on
page 197, emphasizes what seems to be the most important
change or clarification of the law that has occurred in the
recent cases: namely, that where a valid remainder fails
to take effect because no beneficiary survives to take a
vested estate before or at the time it falls into possession,
(a) there results an incomplete testamentary disposition
of a part or the whole of the testator's estate - that is, a
partial or total intestacy: and (b) the undisposed of estate
is a reversion or equitable reversion which is a vested
future estate, and "drops back" and descends from heir to
heir from the original testator, whose will failed to make a
complete disposition, and from whom the future estate
therefore descends in intestacy free of the rule of seisin
and any limitations on the powers of intermediate heirs.
Supra, circa, n. 28.
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Before the decision in Perkins v. Iglehart, and since that
in Conner v. Waring - possibly due to a widespread mis-
understanding by members of the bar arising from the use
by the Court of the phrase "by way of reverter" - such
future interests as that involved in Conner v. Waring were
thought to be mere "possibilities of reverter" and not re-
versions. There had been less misunderstanding as to re-
versions which resulted from an intestacy because of the
failure of the testator to dispose of his entire estate - as,
for instance, when he left a life estate but made no disposi-
tion by way of remainder; or, more especially, where he
expressly attempted to create a remainder and the re-
mainder was void from the beginning because it violated
the rule against perpetuities. The Court now treats both
these latter situations and the situations arising by reason
of failure of "valid" remainders to take effect for want of
surviving beneficiaries, as resulting in reversions.. It follows
that the field in which the rule of seisin operates has thereby
been substantially narrowed.
Furthermore, by treating the 1908 Act as giving to all
intermediate heirs living after the effective date of that Act
a right to will a possibility of reverter, or a right of entry,
the Court has still further narrowed this field. This con-
clusion of the Court as to the effect of the 1908 Act is less
significant from a practical standpoint, however, because
the effect of its conclusion that equitable reversions result
from partial or total intestacy by reason of failure of bene-
ficiaries to survive to take an otherwise legal remainder,
is to greatly reduce the number of occasions upon which a
"possibility of reverter" actually becomes a vested estate
or a right to a possessory estate.
PRESENT STATUS OF POSSlnBLrrES OF REVERTER
AND RIGHTS OF RE-ENTRY
The Court, in the Evans case, makes clear its conception
of a possibility of reverter and indicates that a possibility
of reverter is apparently merely a restricted or somewhat
more narrowly defined right of re-entry as follows:'
'A Supra, n. 8, 65-656.
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" 'If one who has an estate in fee simple creates a
determinable fee in another, he has thereafter merely
a possibility of reacquiring the land by reason of the
occurrence of the contingency named or indicated, and
this possibility is known as a possibility of reverter.
Thus where land is granted for certain purposes, as for
a church, and it is the grantor's intention that it shall
be used for that purpose only, and that on the cessation
of such use, the estate shall end, without any re-entry
by the grantor, a possibility of reverter arises. At com-
mon law such a right is not an estate, present or future,
but is, as its name indicates, a mere possibility of acquir-
ing an estate, and is not generally assignable, nor
devisable; . . . The right of re-entry for breach of a
condition, annexed to an estate in fee simple, is some-
times referred to as a possibility of reverter, or as a
"possibility of forfeiture" .... The grantor of an estate
in fee on condition, having no right or interest left in
the property other than the mere chance of regaining
it because of a breach, cannot alien such chance or right,
except by statutory power, but must either release it
to the owner of the property, or upon his own death let
it pass to his heirs. These are the only two disposi-
tions he can make - it cannot be sold, given away or
otherwise aliened; Reeves, Real Property, secs. 722,
869.' Miller, supra, sec. 210 and note 2. See also Tiffany,
Real Property, 3d Ed., sec. 314. In the two sentences
last quoted the illustration seems to be a 'right of entry
for condition broken' rather than a 'possibility of re-
verter' in the strict narrower sense, but these state-
ments are applicable to possibilities of reverter in
either the narrower or the broader sense. The common
law forbade the transfer of possibilities of reverter to
discourage maintenance and champerty."
"A possibility of reverter is not created by will or
deed. It is a reversionary interest, not created at all
but left undisposed of by the will or deed which dis-
poses of other interests in property already owned. The
common law forbade transfer by will of such a rever-
sionary interest. The Act of 1908 does not change the
interest, but removes the common law ban and permits
transfer by will."
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REROACTIVE EFFECT OF THE WILLS ACT OF 1908
An unusual feature of the decision in the Evans case is
the holding by the court that the 1908 Wills Act is not
retroactive in effect, but, nevertheless, permits the will of
an intermediate heir of a possibility of reverter, or right of
entry on condition broken, to transmit such a future in-
terest, if his will takes effect at any time after the effective
date of that Act, notwithstanding the fact that the future
interest came into existence prior to the passage of the Act,
and the law in effect at the time the future interest came
into existence did not permit control of the devolution by
the will of an intermediate heir. In that case the court
said: 5
"The Act of 1908 is not retroactive; it does not apply
to wills that became effective before the act. But it is
not inoperative as to devises after 1908 of possibilities
of reverter that existed before 1908. Appellants rely
on the statement in Perkins v. Iglehart, 'This Act (of
1908) was not, of course, before the Circuit Court of
Appeals in Shirk v. Lee, supra (4 Cir., 3 F. 2d 256),
because the will in question was executed long prior
to the enactment.' 183 Md. at page 542, 39 A. 2d at page
683. This statement is applicable not only to the origi-
nal will (effective in 1865) construed in Shirk v. Lee,
which left an interest (held to be a possibility of re-
verter) undisposed of, but also to the only will (effec-
tive in 1891) which could have transferred the possi-
bility of reverter if the Act of 1908 had been in effect."
Apparently in support of its conclusion the court in its
opinion referred to the statute as providing that "all rights
and possibilities of reverter shall be subject to be disposed
of by the proprietor's will - not the first proprietor's but
any proprietor's."3 6 Further, with reference to this Act, the
court said: 37
"In Maryland by the Act of 1908 the common law
rule against transfer of possibilities of reverter by





hereditaments . . .which would, in case of the pro-
prietor dying intestate, descend . . . and all rights of
entry for condition broken, and all rights and possibili-
ties of reverter shall be subject to be disposed of, trans-
ferred and passed by his or her last will or codicil... .' "
"Appellants contend (a) that the Act of 1908 is not
retroactive and therefore is not applicable to a rever-
sionary interest left undisposed of in 1859 and (b) that
until Miss Rogers' death in 1944 there never was any
possibility of reverter in any of Mr. Scribner's inter-
mediate heirs. The latter contention confuses a possi-
bility of reverter with an actual reverter and would
nullify the plain words of the Statute. A reversionary
(i.e., undisposed of) interest, whether a reversion (a
vested estate) or a possibility of reverter (no estate at
all), always has an owner or 'proprietor'."
A comparison of the language of the 1916 and the 1908
Acts furnishes no clue as to why the two Acts should be
construed differently with respect to their retroactive effect
on the devolution of estates that have been created by in-
struments that became effective prior to the respective
effective dates of the two Acts. However, even though steps
in the devolution of an estate by descent have occurred by
reason of death subsequent to the effective date of the 1916
Act, the court has held that the 1916 Act does not apply to,
nor affect the descent of, a future interest that started in
course of devolution prior to such effective date. There
may be some doubt as to the constitutional soundness of the
court's interpretation of the applicability of the 1908 Act.
Its expressions of view are dicta. The court's reasoning in
support of its conclusion with reference to the 1908 Act is
that the statute merely removes the bar which prevented
an intermediate heir from transmitting by his will a possi-
bility of reverter that had started in course of descent prior
to the effective date of that Act. It is not clear how the
court can conclude that the 1908 Act permits this, but,
nevertheless, also conclude that the Act of 1916 does not
take effect to allow an intermediate heir of an intestate
contingent remainderman to cast descent to his own heirs,
which latter result fails to remove the bar of :the rule of
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seisin as to such an estate which has originated prior to the
1916 Act. The anomolous result of these rulings is that a
contingent remainder to a designated person created prior
to the 1916 Act - that is, an "estate" - cannot be controlled
in descent by will or inter vivos transfer by an intermediate
heir; whereas a possibility of reverter - which is a mere
"possibility of an estate" and not an "estate" - can be so
controlled by will.
CONFUSION RESULTING FROM THE METHOD
OF THE JUDIcIAL PrtocEss
Some of the confusion or misunderstanding that has
arisen from an attempt to interpret individual decisions of
the Court of Appeals may have its origin in a failure to keep
clearly in mind (1) the issues being decided by the Court
in a particular case, or (2) the fact that the court limited
its application of a rule to the facts of a particular case, or
(3) the extent to which the Court, for the purpose of a
particular decision, may have assumed a premise put for-
ward by one of the parties to the case as to the nature of the
future interest involved, without deciding whether that
premise was correct or incorrect, and then proceeded to
dispose of the case on that basis. For instance, the Court in
the Evans" case said:
"For the particular purposes of (a) alienation, sub-
ject to survival (Hans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Com-
pany, 178 Md. 52, 62, 12 A. 2d 208, 213) and (b) con-
struction and application of a tax statute (Safe Deposit
& Trust Company v. Bouse, 181 Md. 351, 29 A. 2d 906),
we have held that a 'future executory estate or interest'
or a remainder to grandchildren living at the death of a
life tenant is 'vested' in interest, subject to be divested,
during the life tenancy."
In Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Bouse39 the primary
issue was not necessarily the kind of future interest in-
volved, but the applicability or non-applicability of the
Maryland Inheritance Tax statute to the particular future
- Ibid., 652.181 Md. 351; 29 A. 2d 906 (1043).
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interests before the Court. The main point decided in the
case was that a contingent remainder to designated in-
dividuals, created by the will of a testatrix who had died
before the enactment of the Inheritance Tax Statutes of
1935, 1936, 1937 and 1941,4" was subject to taxes imposed
by these statutes. The Court of Appeals decided that the
statutes were applicable and the tax payable - a decision
that was promptly nullified by an emergency Legislative
Act effective May 7, 1943,41 passed by the Legislature before
the lower court had received and acted upon the mandate
of the Court of Appeals, which had reversed the lower
court's decision on this point and remanded the case for a
decree in accordance with its opinion. This Act specifically
provided that the Inheritance Tax Statutes were intended
to apply only to the estates of persons dying after their
respective effective dates.
The Court of Appeals had affirmed the lower court in
its decision in the same case that a similar contingent re-
mainder to designated persons created prior to the tax
statutes by an irrevocable deed of trust, was taxable when
the contingent event occurred and the estate "vested in
possession" in the remaindermen after these Acts became
effective. The 1943 Emergency Act did not alter that de-
cision. That Act relieved from inheritance taxes only the
estates of persons dying before the enactment of the above
mentioned inheritance tax statutes. In the case of the trust
created by the irrevocable deed of trust the creator, who
was himself life tenant, died after the tax statutes were
enacted. The significance of the decision, however, from
the standpoint of the law of devolution of future interests
is that in applying the rules of construction to determine
the nature of the future interest -involved in two similar
testamentary trusts, the Court "for the particular purpose
of construction and application of a tax statute" adopted
a more liberal construction of the nature of a contingent
0 Md. Code (1939), Art. 81, Secs. 109-111.
" Md. Laws 1943, Ch. 573. This Act is not indexed or codified as a section
of Article 81 of the 1947 Cumulative Supplement of the Maryland Code deal-
ing with Revenue and Taxes but appears as a foot note to the title "Inherit-
ance Tax", following Section 103F of that Article.
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class remainder than it generally accepts, thereby relieving
one of the two testamentary trusts from the incidence of
the tax. The limitation, in substance, was to descendants
"then surviving" at the life tenant's death, which was lan-
guage which ordinarily is construed as creating a contingent
class remainder; but the court construed it as creating a
vested class remainder. That was a "liberal" construction
from the standpoint of taxation as it exempted the "vested
remainder" from the inheritance tax; and it was also
"liberal" from the standpoint of the "early vesting rule" as
applied to class remainders. From this latter standpoint,
it is submitted, the conclusion of the Court, if considered in
the light of a somewhat similarly "liberal" interpretation
and application of the rules of construction relating to class
gifts, evidences a desirable tendancy to depart, when the
terms of the will are ambiguous and give it latitude to do so,
from a rigid interpretation and application of those rules
which frequently result in forfeitures because of non-
survival of possible class members to the date of the hap-
ening of the contingent event. The court in this case per-
mitted a person who answered the contingent class descrip-
tion to be treated as a vested remainderman even before
the class "opened", and disregarded the requirement of
survival to the happening of the contingent event, which
is an accepted characteristic of contingent class gifts.
As stated, the Court in Safe Deposit & Trust Company
v. Bouse42 was dealing with the incidence of the Maryland
direct and collateral inheritance taxes with reference to
remainders, including vested remainders, and more par-
ticularly, contingent remainders to a class, created by a
will and irrevocable deeds of trust executed prior to the
inheritance tax statutes of 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1941. The
court had reversed in part and affirmed in part the lower
court and remanded the case for a decree in accordance
with the Appellate Court's decision. The case involved, in
addition to two irrevocable deeds of trust, two testamen-
tary trusts, in each of which a remainder to a class was
created by the will of Mrs. Ellen M. Tormey who had died
Is Supra, n. 39.
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in 1923. Each was identical in terms, the one for her son
providing that after his death the estate should pass "to
his child or children living at the time of his" (that is, the
life tenant's) "death, but if he should die without leaving
any surviving children . . . then to the testator's three
named daughters." These words descriptive of the life
tenant's children were equivalent to the words "then sur-
viving", - words which ordinarily are interpreted by the
court as creating a contingent remainder to a class, which
usually imports a condition of survivorship to the date of
the contingent event, - the death of the life tenant. The
more liberal view adopted by the court in this case and in
some others, regards them, however, as susceptible of in-
terpretation as indicating an intention to create vested
remainders in individual members of the class as soon as
any "child" comes into existence. The remainder was con-
tingent not as to the event (the death of the life tenant)
but as to the persons to take.
In the two other trusts which were also before the
Court, - created respectively by irrevocable trust instru-
ments executed after Mrs. Tormey's death by each of her
two children, a son and a daughter, - they, respectively, as
in the trusts under Mrs. Tormey's will, were life tenants.
Each of these two trusts provided in the same manner for
remainders to the same remaindermen designated in the
two testamentary trusts. In each of the four trusts there
were alternate contingent remainders to other designated
children of Mrs. Tormey. These latter contingent remain-
ders were, therefore, contingent remainders to designated
persons and not contingent remainders to a class of undesig-
nated persons. The contingent event contemplated in all
four of the trusts was the death, respectively, of the life
tenants of those trusts. The life tenants died in 1940 and
1941, respectively. Thus their deaths occurred after the
enactment of the aforementioned tax statutes of 1935, 1936
and 1937, although, as stated, the trusts had been created
prior thereto. The Court held, as to the trust created by
Mrs. Tormey's son and also as to the trust created by her
will for him, that the death of the life tenant, without
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children surviving him, was the "taxable occasion" upon the
occurrence of which the contingent future estate "vested",
and in that sense was then transmitted to the contingent
remaindermen; and the Court sustained the inheritance
taxes under the statutes then in effect, upon the transmis-
sion from him under his deed of trust at his death, and also
upon the transmission to the same remaindermen of the
trust under Mrs. Tormey's will. The court held "that the
contingent remainders vesting under his mother's will at
the time of his death are subject to direct inheritance taxes,
because these remainders did not 'vest' until after the
Direct Inheritance Tax Act took effect." The contingent
remaindermen who took upon the occasion of this life ten-
ant's death were his three named sisters, direct descendants
of the testatrix. There was no direct inheritance tax in
Maryland at the time of the testatrix's death in 1923.
VEsTED REMA=NnEEs To A CLAss
In the course of its opinion in Safe Deposit and Trust Co.
v. Bouse,'s the Court summarized the well settled law as
to vested remainders to a class. The Court said:
"The law is established in Maryland that where
there is a bequest to a person for life, with remainders
to his children, the remainders are contingent until one
of such children is born; for a contingent remainder
is one which is either limited to a person not in being
or not certain or ascertained, or so limited to a certain
person that his right to the estate depends upon some
contingent event in the future. But when a child is
born, and the remainderman is then ascertainable, the
remainder immediately becomes vested, for a vested
remainder is one which is limited to a person in being,
whose right to the estate does not depend upon the
happening or failure of any future event. So a bequest
to a certain person for life, and at his death to any
surviving child or children, but in the event he should
die without issue, his estate should go to a third person
gives a vested remainder to any child of the life tenant
immediately upon its birth. The defeasible nature of
the remainders resulting from the defeat of the remain-
4" Ibid., 356-7.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
der interest upon the death of any child before the
age of 21 years does not have the effect of making the
remainders contingent. This possibility of such loss is
a condition subsequent, not a condition precedent. As
the law prefers to treat a remainder as vested rather
than contingent, remainders are often held to be vested
even though they may be defeated before the termina-
tion of the precedent estate and consequently may
never be enjoyed in possession. If the condition subse-
quent or contingency, which would cause a vested
estate to be divested, if it occurred, does not occur,
there is no divestiture and the estate remains vested."
It was unusual to apply this well settled law as to vested
class remainders to the testamentary trust for Mrs. Tor-
mey's daughter for life and after her death to her children
"then living" - she having children who survived her,
because the limitation in remainder to children "then
living" is usually interpreted as one creating a contingent
class gift and not a vested remainder to a class, subject to
being divested.
"LIBERAL" CONSTRUCTION
A. The Words "Then Surviving"
In Hans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company," one of the
"earlier cases" among the "recent" decisions here under
review, the Court had before it, as in the case of Safe
Deposit & Trust Company v. Bouse,4 a will whose language
was clearly expressed in words susceptible of being con-
strued to indicate an intention to create contingent remain-
ders in the testator's grandchildren living at the death of
the life tenants - that is, remainders contingent as to the
persons to take. In 1916, before the death of the last sur-
viving life tenant in 1927, the plaintiff-appellant, one of the
testator's grandchildren, conveyed her future interest in
the trust to the Safe Deposit & Trust Company, Trustee.
About twelve years later, after the last life tenant had
died, the trustees asked the Court's guidance in distributing
the trust. As in the Bouse case, the court, in affirming the
-178 Md. 52, 12A. 2d 208 (1940).
5Supra, n. 39.
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lower court's decision, held that the future interest in-
volved was a vested remainder in each grandchild living at
the testator's death, subject to being divested by death
before the happening of the contingent event - the death
of the last life tenant, - and subject to the quantum of the
share of the vested remainder being reduced by the birth
of other grandchildren during the period before the life
tenant's death - the specified contingent event.
B. "Issue"
In Bishop v. Homey46 the Court had held that a remain-
der to the "issue" of a life tenant should be construed as
meaning - to the "children" and that the remainder in-
terest was a vested remainder as to each such child in being
at any time during the period between the death of the
testator and the death of the life tenant. The court in the
later case of Reese v. Reese47 correctly cites the case of
Bishop v. Homey4 to the effect that such remainders were
held to be vested, subject to being divested. The will in-
volved in Bishop v. Homey did provide that if the life
tenant were not survived by "issue", that is, "children", the
property would pass to other contingent remaindermen,
but none of the life tenant's children predeceased her so
that this contingency did not occur. During her lifetime
the living children of the life tenant joined with her in
executing a mortgage of the future interest in the trust
property, the validity of which was sustained."
- 177 Md. 353, 9 A. 2d 597 (1939) ; See Note, The Vesting of Remainders
and Their Alienability, 5 Md. L. Rev. 98 (1940). The discussion therein of
Hans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company refers to the remainders in the
Bishop case as vested not subject to being divested by death of the re-
mainderman prior to the death of the life tenant. This is an accurate state-
ment so far as the effect of death of one of the several children who were
remaindermen, is concerned, but if all of the children had predeceased their
mother, the life tenant, their estates would have been divested under the
express provisions of the will.
" 58 A. 2d 643 (1948).
" Supra, n. 46.
9 Bishop v. Horney is authority for the same view expressed by the Court
in Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Bouse, supra, n. 43. Bishop v. Horney
is not particularly significant as establishing any new law with respect to
the devolution of a future interest. Its significance lies primarily in the
emphasis given by the Court's opinion, to the views that it had formerly
expressed to the effect that even if the mortgagors of this future interest
had held merely a "possibility" of a future estate, and not a "vested" estate,
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C. A Contingent Remainder To A Class: Changing
To A Vested Remainder
In Boynton v. Barton,0 decided in 1949 the court's de-
cision reflected the view that the future interest, which at
the testator's death was a contingent remainder to a class
of persons, may, by the happening of an event which occurs
after the testator's death and before the time when the
contingent event happens - in that case the death of the
life tenant "without issue" surviving, - change the future
interest to a vested remainder to designated persons. The
court reviewed its recent application of the rules relating
to contingent class remainders, as follows:5"
"The remainder over upon the death of Mrs. Smith
without issue was clearly contingent as to the event.
Hammond v. Piper, 185 Md. 314, 317, 44 A. 2d 756, 758,
and cases cited. In that case we held that 'the con-
tingency was as to the event, and not as to the takers';
and that 'remainders over to the "other children" were
not gifts to a class, but were gifts to persons designated
by description', with the result that they were both
descendable and devisable. See also Simon v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co.. .... Md. ..... ,59 A. 2d 199. The old rule
of descent that excludes an intermediate heir, discussed
in those cases, has no application here.. In the instant
case the persons who would take upon the happening
of the contingency could not be ascertained at the time
of the testator's death as in Hammond v. Piper, supra,
but they were ascertainable at the death of Mrs. Wilkin,
at which time her son was over twenty-one years of
age, and both Mrs. Boynton and J. Hurst Wilkin were
living."
courts of equity in Maryland sustain a transfer for a valuable consideration
of such a possibility of a future estate on the theory that it is a contract to
convey the property if, as, and when it falls into the assignor's possession.
See cases cited in Bishop v. Horney, Including Schapiro v. Howard, 113
Md. 360, 78 A. 58 (1910), and Keys v. Keys, 148 Md. 397, 129 A. 504 (1925) ;
See also Miller v. Hirschman, 170 Md. 145, 183 A. 259 (1936) ; Reno, Aliena-
bility And Transmissibility Of Future Interests In Maryland, supra, n. 7, 98:
Myerberg, Maryland Ewanines The Proposed Uniform Property Act, 4 Md.
Law Rev. 1-13 (1939) ; Reilly v. Mackenzie, 151 Md. 216, 134 A. 502, 48
A. L. R. 778 (1926) ; Suskin & Berry v. Rumley, 37 Fed. 2d 304 (C. C. A.
4th, 1930), and, most recently, In re Clayton's Estate, 74 A. 2d 1 (1950).
40 A. 2d 750 (1949).
Ibid., 753.
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CLASS RLNDMaS
A. Rules of Construction and Definition
The court in Boynton v. Barton52 refers to the leading
case on class gifts in Maryland-Demill v. Reid,53 as follows:
"The appellant relies strongly upon the case of
Demill v. Reid... In that case there were remainders,
after a life estate to a grandson, to the children of the
life tenant, or if he left none, then to the children of
the testator's son Henry. These remainders were de-
scribed as alternative, contingent remainders. At the
testator's death, Henry had six children, three of whom
survived the life tenant, as did Henry himself. It was
held, that only 'those who were children of Henry...
at the time the contingency happened' could take, and
'we find nothing in other parts of the will to warrant
the inference that the testator intended anything else,
nor any necessity for putting a different construction
on his language.' In Lamour v. Rich, 71 Md. 369, 384,
18 A. 702, 704, decided by the same court it was said:
'a future period having been fixed, and the time of its
occurrence having been uncertain until the death of
Mrs. Miller (the life tenant), the remainders were
clearly alternative contingent remainders, or contin-
gent remainders with a double aspect, as they are some-
times called; . .. these remainders never vested in
Louisa R. Miller .. .because she died in the lifetime
of her mother, before the period fixed for the remain-
ders to vest.' These cases indicate that the question is
one of intention which may prevail, in a particular case,
over the rule of early vesting. In both cases, however,
the choice was between a vesting at the death of the
testator, or settlor, and at the death of the life tenant
when the gift over became ripe for distribution."
The court in the Boynton" case then refers to the definition
of class gifts and the rule in Demill v. Reid as discussed in
the Evans55 case decision as follows:
"The definition of class gifts and the rule of Demill
v. Reid were fully discussed in the recent case of Evans
92 Ibid.
71 Md. 175, 17 A. 1014 (1889).
51 Supra, n. 50, 753-754.
4 Supra, n. 8.
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v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. .... Md. ..... , 58 A. 2d 649,
652. After citing various criticisms of the rule, Judge
Markell, speaking for the court, said: 'For the particu-
lar purposes of (a) alienation, subject to survival (Hans
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 178 Md. 52, 62, 12 A. 2d
208, 213), and (b) construction and application of a
tax statute (Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (of Baltimore)
v. Bouse, 181 Md. 351, 29 A. 2d 906), we have held that
a "future executory estate or interest" or a remainder
to grandchildren living at the death of a life tenant is
"vested" in interest, subject to be divested, during the
life tenancy. These cases are not to be regarded as
overruling Demill v. Reid and the rules of construction
of class gifts, which have been too long and too often
approved by this court to be now overruled.'
'However the Jarman definition of a class gift and
the effect of such gift in Demill v. Reid are both predi-
cated on the intention of the testator to make a gift to
"a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of
the gift, to be ascertained at a future date." Without
such an intention, there is no class and the lore of class
gifts, including Demill v. Reid, is irrelevant. Cf. Restate-
ment, Property, Sec. 279, comment b. The "antithesis"
of a class gift "is a gift to an individual either by name
or by some description sufficiently explicit to permit
the donee to be identified as the particular individual
for whom the gift was intended." Boulden v. Dean, 167
Md. 101, 106, 173 A. 26, 28. The last case in which
Demill v. Reid was cited by this court involved such
"gifts to persons designated by description," viz., con-
tingent remainders to "my other children," who else-
where in the will were mentioned by name. Hammond
v. Piper, 185 Md. 314, 318, 44 A. 2d 756, 757. Though
Demill v. Reid has frequently been cited by this court,
the result in that case has seldom been reached in sub-
sequent cases.... In the later cases, and some earlier,
when gifts were not expressly conditioned upon sur-
vival, e.g., by the words "then living" or other unequi-
vocal words, they were, by the rule of early vesting or
by analogous reasoning, held not to be class gifts, or
by early determination of class membership they be-
came vested and ceased to be class gifts.' We found it
unnecessary to decide whether the deed in the Evans
case did make a class gift, conditioned upon survival,
as the case was decided upon other grounds."
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The portion of the Evans opinion omitted in the above quo-
tation is as follows:
"'In Stahl v. Emery, 147 Md. 123, 127 A. 760, a
similar result was reached with respect to children who
predeceased the testator. In 1929 this result was pre-
vented under future wills by amendment of the lapsed
legacy statute. Code, Art. 93, secs. 340, 341. In Robinson
v. Mercantile Trust Company, 180 Md. 336, 343, 344, 24
A. 2d 299, 138 A. L. R. 1427, what was said in Stahl v.
Emery as to remainders to a class after a life estate was
held to be obiter'." '
In the Boynton case the court points out that the will of
John E. Hurst there involved, which became effective at
his death in 1904 did not, in providing for the contingent
gift over, in remainder, upon death of one of his children
without leaving issue at her death, employ the word "chil-
dren" which might import a class gift, but rather had pro-
vided that the share of any of his children who might die
without leaving issue surviving, should be "distributed
among and form a part of the other shares into which the
said residue of my estate shall have been divided." The
court reached the conclusion that when the life tenant,
Mrs. Wilkin predeceased the life tenant of another of the
trust shares (Mrs. Smith), Mrs. Wilkin having been sur-
vived by two children who had reached twenty-one years
of age at the time of her death, and Mrs. Smith having sub-
sequently died without issue having survived her, the re-
mainder after Mrs. Smith's death, which had theretofore
been a contingent remainder to a class, changed at the time
of the death of Mrs. Wilkin to a contingent remainder to
designated persons. The court commented as follows:57
"In the case at bar, while the gift over is not to
designated persons, neither does it employ the word
'children', which might import a class, as in Demill v.
Reid, supra. The direction is that it be 'distributed
among and form a part of the other shares into which
the said residue of my estate shall have been divided,'
that is to say, added to the share set aside for Mrs.
-Ibid., 653.
51 Supra, circa, ns. 50-54, 754.
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Wilkin during her life, and upon her death leaving
descendants the oldest of whom is over twenty-one, to
such descendants per stirpes, 'then living'. The words
'then living' seem clearly to refer to descendants living
at the death of Mrs. Wilkin, and not to descendants
living at the happening of the contingency whereby the
share was augmented.... In short we find in the lan-
guage of the will itself no intention that the gift over
is conditional upon survivorship to the happening of
the contingency, but on the contrary a positive indi-
cation that the children of Mrs. Wilkin, living at her
death, should take. If this could properly be described
as a class gift, at the time of the testator's death, its
membership was fixed and determined, and it ceased to
be a class, at Mrs. Wilkin's death. At that point it was
contingent only as to the event. In Reese v. Reese,...,
we said: 'The testator has the right to fix the period of
vesting, and if he does so with reasonable certainty, his
intention will be carried out. He can postpone the
period of vesting and make it depend upon a contin-
gency, and, if he does so, the estate will not vest until
the happening of such contingency. ... The most im-
portant rule of construction on the question when an
estate was intended to vest is that the law favors the
earliest vesting of estates. Where there is more than
one period mentioned in a will, the court will generally
adopt the earlier one unless this construction is con-
trary to the testator's intention as disclosed by the
terms of the will'."
B. Avoiding Intestacy: Contingent Remainder To
Designated Persons And Not To A Class
Reese v. Reese,5" decided on the same day as the Evans"
case, is perhaps the most notable of the recent decisions
that adopted a "liberal" construction of the rules relating
to class gifts. The Court reached the conclusion that a
future interest which might have been construed as a con-
tingent remainder to an indefinite class, carrying an implied
condition of survivorship, was in fact a contingent remain-
der to designated persons. The very ineptness in drafts-
manship and terminology of the will resulted in such am-
5 Supra, n. 47.
Supra, n. 8.
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biguities as to the meaning and intention of the testator
that the court could indulge the rules of construction which
carry a presumption against intestacy and in favor of
earlier vesting of future estates.60 The court, in the Evans
case, 6 1 referring to the Scribner will involved in that case
mentioned the Reese will as follows:
"The deed, though not a model of clarity or stand-
ardized form, is not, like the will in Reese v. Reese,
supra, a unique jumble of words falling into no set
classification but containing their own guides to their
own meaning."
By rules of construction, as is apparent from what has
been said above, the court determines what kind of a future
interest exists as a result of the provisions of a will or other
instrument. By rules of law the court determines how the
future interest, once identified, devolves in course of de-
scent. The rules of construction of class gifts are also rules
of law. They are too well settled in Maryland, as the court
points out to be discarded or departed from at this late date,
even though they are not in harmony with the rules relating
to class gifts as stated in the Restatement, Property. What-
ever the nature of a future interest, the rules of law which
are in force at the time of a person's death become a part
of his will and control the descent of any future estate
which was thereby created or came into existence by reason
of his death. .In Reese v. Reese, the Court restates the rules
of construction which guide it in identifying the -future
interest as a class gift or otherwise, as follows:62
"It is an accepted rule that where there are two
possible constructions, either of which can be adopted
without straining the language of the will, the court
will adopt that construction which disposes of the en-
tire estate, rather than one which results in a total or
partial intestacy. The will before us contains no resid-
uary clause. The gift in remainder is to the members of
one class, if any, but, if none, then to the members of
another class or to designated individuals. A gift to a
60 See also: Snyder's Estate v. Denit, 72 A. 2d 757 (1950).
Supra, n. 8. 653.
a Supra, n. 47, 647-648.
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class has been defined as a gift of an aggregate sum to
a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of
the gift, to be ascertained at a future time, and who
are all to take in equal or in some other definite propor-
tions, the share of each being dependent for its amount
upon the ultimate number of persons. . . . Here the
clause in dispute contains two alternatives, each in-
separable ultimate limitations (1) to the children of
John or (2) to other grandchildren of the testator. It is
a general rule that if a gift violates the rule against
perpetuities as to any member of a class, it is void as to
all members of the class. If a gift is to a class, and the
gift is good as to some members of the class, but is
within the rule against perpetuities as to other mem-
bers, the entire gift must fail.... The rule against per-
petuities is that no interest is good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest. Where property is ren-
dered inalienable, or its vesting is deferred for a longer
period than that prescribed by the rule, the law de-
nounces the devise, bequest or grant as a perpetuity.
"The term 'vested', as used in the law of property,
signifies that there has been the fixation of a present
right to either the immediate or future enjoyment of
property.... The term 'vested' has also another mean-
ing, which is so frequently given to it that it cannot be
styled improper. This other meaning is 'transmissible'.
As Professor Gray of Harvard has said, 'Such double
meaning is, however, very unfortunate, as it has lead
to much confusion.' Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities,
4th Ed., sec. 118. Vesting in that secondary sense is not
sufficient to escape the rule against perpetuities. The
interest must vest in the sense of becoming a vested
remainder. The rule demands that the vesting in in-
terest, not necessarily the vesting in possession or en-
joyment, must occur within the prescribed period. If
it were held in this case that the estate does not vest
until the time for possession and enjoyment, the limita-
tion would be within the rule against perpetuities, for
it might have been possible that John B. Reese would
marry a woman not yet born at the time of the testa-
tor's death, and she might live longer than 21 years
after John's death. The Court, in determining the com-
mencement of a future interest, considers possible
events, and does not look back upon events which have
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occurred to see whether the estate has extended be-
yond the prescribed limit, but looks forward from the
time the limitation was made to see whether there was
then, according to its terms, a possibility that it might
so extend. The event, upon the happening of which the
remainder is to vest, must be one that is certain to
happen within the prescribed period, otherwise the
limitation is void....
"It is well settled that where there is a devise to
a person for life, with remainders to his children, the
remainders are contingent until one of such children
is born; for a contingent remainder is one which is
either limited to a person not in being or not certain or
ascertained, or so limited to a certain person that his
right to the estate depends upon some contingent event
in the future. But when a child is born, and the remain-
derman is then ascertainable, the remainder immedi-
ately becomes vested, for a vested remainder is one
which is limited to a person in being, whose right to the
estate does not depend upon the happening or the
failure of any future event. Hence, a devise to a cer-
tain person for life, and at his death to any child or
children he may have, but in the event he should die
without issue, his estate should go to a third person,
gives a vested remainder to any child of the life tenant
immediately upon its birth. As the law prefers to treat
a remainder as vested rather than contingent, remain-
ders are often held to be vested even though they may
be defeated before the termination of the precedent
estate and consequently may never be enjoyed in pos-
session. If the contingency, which would cause a vested
estate to be divested if it occurred, does not occur, there
is no divestiture, and the estate remains vested."
The court then concludes that although, among other
express provisions the will provided that: "In case of the
death of Mary L. Reese, John B. Reese, and the wife of John
B. Reese, then the whole of said property to go to the
children of John B. Reese and wife, if any, and (7) if no
children, then the said property to revert to my grand-
children, the issue of both of my sons Charles A. Reese and
Francis D. Reese, as tenants in common, the issue of said
sons to take same per capita", it was "clear from the entire
will that it was the testator's general intention that, after
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the life estates, his property should go to grandchildren",
thus construing the future interest as a contingent remain-
der to designated persons, the children of testator's two
sons, Charles and Francis, who were living at his death and
"whom he knew".63 The court felt that it was more likely
that he intended his estate to go to them than to grand-
children born after his death and before the contingent
event - the death of his son, John, the life tenant, without
issue. The court took the view that there was special signifi-
cance in the use of the term "as tenants in common", and
the word "revert", as indicating an intention to designate
definite individuals, although the testator did not name any
of them. The court felt that he intended to designate only
those grandchildren who were children of his sons, Charles
and Francis. After taking note of the appellant's first alter-
nate contention that the limitation in remainder after the
life of a possible unborn widow of the life tenant would
violate the rule against perpetuities the court, nevertheless,
decided the case after a general statement of the rules of
construction, without further explanation of the effect of
this limitation to the son's "widow".
THE EFFECT OF OBITER DICTA
It is suggested that an additional reason why the court's
decisions with reference to future interests are not infre-
quently difficult to appraise is that the court frequently
refers in the course of its opinions to rules of law that it
regards as well settled and which are in fact well settled,
but which are dicta as to the particular issues before the
court, and do not apply to the particular case. 4
See: Snyder's Estate v. Denit, supra, n. 60.See e.g. the Evans case, supra, n. 8, where the court assumed, for the pur-
pose of deciding the issue, that the remainder before the court for considera-
tion was a contingent remainder to a class or classes of undesignated per-
sons, but the court never determined whether this assumption was correct:
Boynton v. Barton, supra, n. 50, where it was said: "We found it unneces-
sary to decide whether the deed in the Evans case did make a class gift,
conditioned upon survival, as the case was decided upon other grounds.";
Conner v. Waring, 8upra, n. 4, where, after its lengthy statement of the rule
of seisin, the court holds that the exception to the rule, - by which an in-
termediate heir could, under the common law rule, do acts by inter v'ivos
deed or testamentary disposition that would be effective to make a new
stock of descent, - nevertheless, did not apply to the "equitable interests'
in that case.
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NON-LAPSE STATUTES
The only one of the "recent cases" in which the 1929
amendment to the non-lapse statute65 is mentioned (al-
though not applicable in the particular case) is the Evans"
case. That statute, it is submitted, could not save from
lapsing a contingent gift to a class, nor could it save any
remainder except one as to which the remaindermen are
designated persons - either vested remainders or contin-
gent remainders to designated persons. Like the original
non-lapse statute67 this supplemental statute contemplated
that there be named or designated legatees whose personal
representatives can take the legacy. That would not be
the case with a contingent remainder to a class. Under the
settled rules of construction as to such remainders the
class does not "open" - the persons to take are not deter-
mined - until the contingent event occurs, which changes
the contingent remainder to a vested remainder. Conse-
quently, there is still a condition of survivorship essential
in connection with such a class remainder, so that a person
who could have qualified to answer the class description, if
he had survived, nevertheless, cannot qualify if he fails
to survive, and, therefore, never is a legatee who has any
future interest that can be saved by the non-lapse statute.
Although the case of Baltimore v. White 8 did not in-
volve a future interest, it is, among the recent decisions in
the field of testamentary law, one that reflects a novel
result. In that case the court, interpreting the non-lapse
statute, reached the conclusion that this statute, interpreted
in conjunction with the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act69
and the Maryland "Escheat" Act,70 does not save from laps-
6 Md. Code (1939), Art. 93, Sec. 341:
"In all wills executed after July 1, 1929, unless a contrary intention
Is expressly stated in the will, the provisions of Section 340 In regard
to lapse shall apply to all devises and bequests to two or more persons
as a class in the same manner as though such devises or bequests had
been made to such persons by their individual names."
" Supra, n. S.
w Md. Code (1939), Art. 93, Sec. 340.
6189 Md. 571, 56 A. 2d 824 (1948).
MMd. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 35, Sees. 89-96.
"Md. Code (1939), Art. 93, Sec, 143,
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing a legacy to a deceased person who has no next of kin
or distributees within the degrees of relationship which
would qualify them to take. The case involved a husband
and wife who died under circumstances which made it
impossible to determine in fact which had died first. They
each had similar wills. Each will left all of the testator's
property to the other. There were "personal representa-
tives" - that is, nephews and nieces, of the wife who would
have taken under the non-lapse statute the legacy to her
under her husband's will had she died first, but if he were
regarded as having died first there were no relatives of his
within the required degrees of relationship, to take as his
distributees under the statute. The court held that which-
ever of the two died first the property of both estates would
pass to the wife's distributees in intestacy. Had she died
first his legacy to her would, under the non-lapse statute,
have been saved from lapsing and passed to her nephews
and nieces. Had he died first, however, the non-lapse statute
would not have saved her legacy to him since, the court
held, the School Board is not his distributee or "representa-
tive", and there would be an intestacy as to that legacy
under her will with the result that it would have been dis-
tributable in intestacy from her estate to her own nephews
and nieces. The School Board is not, said the court, his
distributee or "representative". Section 808 P.L.L., Article
4 (City Charter, 1938, Sec. 1002), 71 provides not for "dis-
tribution" to the School Board as the "representative" of
intestates, but for "payments" to it of the funds "which
remain undistributed for want of legal representatives of
the intestates to claim the same". The Court said:72
"Art. 93, secs. 143 and 144 are in effect similar. Both
sec. 1006, P.L.L. Art. 4, and Art. 93, sec. 144, require
repayment by the School Board or the County Com-
missioners (as the case may be) if 'legal representa-
tives' of the intestate appear. The purpose of the lapsed
legacy statute is to transfer the legacy to the legatee's
distributees or 'representatives' . . . - to prevent in-
testacy, not to cause escheat (or the equivalent with
7Charter & P. L. L. of Baltimore (Flack, 1949), See. 622.
,2Supra, n. 68, 575, 576.
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respect to personal property). We have been referred
to no case in any jurisdiction, and we have found none,
which holds that a lapsed legacy statute causes escheat
for want of distributees of the legatee. If, therefore, the
wife survived, she died intestate since her husband left
no distributees or 'representatives'; her estate, there-
fore went to her nephews and nieces."
In the case of Simon v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company,7 3
it was held that the non-lapse statute saved from lapsing
a contingent remainder to a designated person which had
been transmitted by the will of the contingent remainder-
man to her deceased husband. Her will became effective a
few months before the contingent event, which changed the
future estate from a contingent remainder to a designated
person to a vested remainder. At the time of her death her
deceased husband's distributee - his nearest relative -
was his son who also was the Settlor and life tenant under a
trust that he had created, and under which he had given
his father and mother, or the survivor of them, the contin-
gent remainder involved. The mother survived the father
and predeceased the son. The son died without being sur-
vived by descendants, which was the contingent event
which changed the contingent remainder to a vested re-
mainder, although the trust estate continued during the
lifetime of a surviving life tenant, the son's widow, before
it fell into possession. The son, therefore, occupied the
status of a distributee under the non-lapse statute, of the
very contingent remainder which his trust had created in
his mother, whose will had bequeathed it to his father. The
court held that by virtue of the non-lapse statute the son
was his father's "personal representative" to take the legacy
of the contingent remainder left by his mother's will to his
father; and upon his (the son's) death his own will trans-
mitted it to his wife, his sole beneficiary, through whom it
had been transmitted by her will to her son, the appellant.
59 A. 2d 199 (1948).
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PARTIES To A PROCEEDING INVOLVING INTERPRETATION
OF RULES OF CONSTRUCTION, DESCENT
AND DEVOLUTION
The latest case before the court involving the devolution
of a future interest was McMahon v. Consistory of St. Paul's
Reformed Church.74 The case involved an executory devise
after a determinable fee and an alleged breach of a condi-
tion subsequent. The court declined to decide the issues
and returned the case for joinder of other necessary parties
whose interests might be affected. Obviously that action
was consistent with the law relating to the devolution of a
future interest. If, on final determination of the issues the
future interest there involved were held to be an executory
devise to the heirs of the original testator (who died prior
to the 1916 Act), and not void under the rule against per-
petuities,75 or if there were an intestacy and the devolution
of a reversion were involved, the wills of the intermediate
heirs might have affected the course of descent. In either
of these eventualities it would not be sufficient to join only
the heirs of the original testator in being when the alleged
breach of condition subsequent occurred, as was done by
the petitioners in this case, apparently on the theory that
the rule of seisin would exclude intermediate heirs. Fur-
thermore, if the Court were to determine that the future
interest involved is a right of re-entry or a possibility of
reverter, the 1908 Wills Act, according to the "non-retro-
active" - "retroactive" effect given it by the Court of
Appeals in the Evans case,"6 would have permitted the wills
of intermediate heirs who have died since 1908 to control
the course of descent.
- 71 A. 2d 17 (1950).
7Md. Code (1939), Art. 93, Sec. 333, states the general rule against per-
petuities as follows:
"No will, testament or codicil shall be effectual to create any interest
or perpetuity, or make any limitation, or appoint any uses not now per-
mitted by the constitution or laws of this State."
See also: Md. Code (1939), Art. 93, Secs. 308, 334, 343.
At common law the rule against perpetuities was not applicable to rights
of reverter.
" Supra, n. 8.
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McMahon v. The Consistory again came before the Court
of Appeals after joinder of additional parties and a trial
of the case on the merits.77 It is interesting to note that
the Court held that there was no doubt as to the nature of
the estate which the will purported to give The Consistory;
that the devise was a devise for corporate purposes of The
Consistory and created no trust, but was an outright devise
in fee simple on conditional limitation. However, the Court
held that the will created an executory devise which was
void because in violation of the rule against perpetuities,
and that consequently The Consistory's defeasible fee be-
came an absolute fee and The Consistory had full ownership
of the property involved.
In the course of its opinion the Court held that "children"
means "children" and not "heirs" of the testator; and that
the words "children or their respective heirs per stirpes"
to whom the conditional limitation, if effective, would have
carried the estate had there been a breach of condition,
means "children or their descendants". In this will, the
Court said, the words "if living" were clearly implied, so
that the language used in effect meant "my said three
children if then living or if any of my children shall there-
tofore have died, their respective heirs per stirpes then
living". The Court made the observation: "A possibility
of reverter, though not an estate, is a vested reversionary
interest and therefore is not subject to the rule against
perpetuities. A limitation over is a future estate, by execu-
tory devise and therefore is subject to the rule against per-
petuities". The Court held the future interest there in-
volved to be a future estate - an executory devise - void
as violating the rule against perpetuities.
The other case which the court recently remanded with-
out deciding all of the issues was Walker v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Company,"8 in which the Court pointed out that under
the will involved there was no provision for resurvivorship
of "accrued shares", and that the actual disposition by the
trustee of certain portions of the income during prior years,
-75 A. 2d 122 (1950).
'65 A. 2d 311 (1949).
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after various life tenants had died, had apparently been
based on an erroneous interpretation of the will.
ACCRUED SHARES Do NoT RESuivxvE
That accrued shares do not resurvive in the absence of
express provisions in the will to that effect, is also the hold-
ing of the court in Marbury v. Bouse. 9 It was further held
in that case, under a will that provided for primary sur-
vivorship of the original shares of the trust estate among
the testator's remaining children, that the death of the last
life tenant, without descendants surviving her, resulted in
an intestacy, a reversion, and descent of the reversion from
the original testator to and from the intermediate heirs
without application of the rule of seisin. The final share did
not belong to the last of the six life tenants, who died with-
out issue, and did not pass under her will. Survivorship
among testator's "remaining children" did not import sur-
vivorship to living descendants of a deceased child.
RENUNCIATION: ACCELERATION OF REmAINDERS
Keen v. Brooks"0 is one of the recent decisions which
reiterates the law that renunciation by a life tenant, a
daughter of the testator, accelerates remainders. The re-
mainders were to the testator's two named grandchildren-
that is, vested remainders to designated persons, with a pro-
vision for alternate contingent remainders to the issue of
such a grandchild who might die leaving such issue, and
to the other grandchild, should either die without leaving
surviving issue. In this case the court quotes with approval
the rules applicable to the solution of problems growing out
of a renunciation, as stated in the Restatement, Property,
sec. 231, and approves the rule (although not applicable to
the particular issue in the case before it) that "the accel-
erated interest is not defeasible upon the subsequent occur-
rence of the designated event". The court reviews the
Maryland authorities and those from other jurisdictions and
Supra, n. 31.
°186 Md. 543, 47 A. 2d 67 (1946).
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holds the Maryland rule to be consistent with the rule as
stated in the Restatement. "While the determination in
each case depends upon the intention of the testator, as
gathered from the will", the court found no such intention
in the case at bar. The case is of especial interest because
it presents a situation in which, upon renunciation by the
life tenant and acceleration of the vested remainders, the
vested remaindermen immediately took a possessory estate.
This resulted in cutting off from the children or other de-
scendants of such vested remaindermen any possibility of
ever taking the future interest which existed in them until
the renunciation by the life tenant, under the provisions
of the will by which, upon the death of a vested remainder-
man prior to the death of the life tenant, the remainder
would have been divested and would have passed at the




Another recent case, which involved the effect of a con-
dition subsequent that might have ended a determinable
fee, was Keyser v. Calvary Church.8 ' The opinion reflects
the well-settled view that courts do not favor forfeitures.
The decision was to the effect that economic conditions dur-
ing the recent war period, including governmental limita-
tions on building and the use of building materials, had
rendered impossible the performance of the condition - the
erection of a building as specified within a five year period
after the death of the testator, with the result that the
condition subsequent was void and the bequest and devise
became absolute and not subject to be divested by reason
of the non-performance of the condition. The case empha-
sizes the fact that the courts in construing a will which is
ambiguous prefer an interpretation that a condition, if one
is found to exist, is intended to be a condition subsequent
and not a condition precedent, and that this rule of con-
8'64 A. 2d 748 (1949).
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struction grows out of the rule that favors the early vesting
of an estate.82
RuLE AGAINST PERPETurI
A. Powers of Appointment
The rule against perpetuities continues to play an im-
portant part in the recent cases. It was that rule which
caused the intestacy resulting in a reversion in Perkins v.
Iglehart.ss In Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company,"4
a power of appointment was involved which was held
to have been exercised partially invalidly because of the
attempted appointment to pay the debts and funeral ex-
penses of the donee. The remaining dispositions under the
exercise of the power were sustained under circumstances
in which the court held that to do so did not violate any
general "dispositive scheme" in the donor's will, there being
no such scheme or plan evidenced which she "was obliged
to carry out". The portions of the estate invalidly appointed
dropped back and passed under the respective donors' wills.
The opinion of the court reviews the law relating to the
definitions and manner of exercise of powers of appoint-
ment and the rules determining whether such a power or
its method of exercise is valid or void. The Lamkin case
refers to the recent case of Connor v. O'Hara,5 as authority
for the well-settled Maryland law that the property ap-
1 Accord: Gray v. Harriet Lane Home, 64 A. 2d 102 (1949), emphasizing
the rule that "conditions subsequent are not favored in the law", and will
not be implied in the absence of clear language in the will evidencing an
intention on the part of a testator to create such a condition. This case,
together with Fletcher v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., supra, n. 13, holds that
neither the Cy Pres statute, Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 16, Sec. 279A, nor
the statute validating charitable trusts in Maryland, Md. Code (1939), Art.
16, Sec. 279, are retroactive to save from invalidity a trust which became
effective prior to their enactment, or which violates the rule against per-
petuities. It is particularly interesting to note that the Gray case cited the
Evans case, supra, n. 8, on the non-retroactive effect of statutes, in which,
as above mentioned, the court professed not to give the 1908 Wills Act
retroactive effect in its application to the transmission by will of a possi-
bility of reverter. The decision is also of special interest in that it reviews
the Maryland authorities on the main point in the case relating to condi-
tions subsequent, especially commenting on Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. Peabody Institute, 175 Md. 186, 200 A. 375 (1938).
Supra, n. 3.
64 A. 2d 704 (1949).
-188 Md. 527, 53 A. 2d 88 (1947).
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pointed is the property of the donor and, therefore, can-
not be appointed by the donee for the payment of his debts,
nor to his own estate, even though the Maryland rule in
this respect differs from that in all other jurisdictions,
except Kentucky and Rhode Island. As a result of this
view, Conor v. O'Hara further emphasizes the fact that the
court holds to the proposition, even where the incidence
of Maryland inheritance taxes is concerned, that the rules
of construction and law which determine the nature and
devolution of a future interest also determine in most in-
stances the incidence of such a tax, because the property
passes from the donor and not from the donee. The Lamkin
case is also authority for the law applied to determine the
issue therein, that in the exercise of a general power of
appointment the donee may, without violating the power,
create a new trust and give the beneficiary of that trust a
power of appointment. The court holds that such a disposi-
tion is not an invalid "delegation" of the original power.
On this point the court quotes and approves the Restate-
ment, Property, Future Interests, sec. 357, saying:"
"There are no Maryland cases directly upon the
question, but in at least two, a testator had conferred
a general testamentary power of appointment, and the
donee had exercised it by creating an equitable life
estate with an appurtenant power of appointment.
These cases are Reed v. McIlvain, 113 Md. 140, 77 A. 329,
and Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 A. 1094.
The question involved in these cases was not the right
to make the second appointment, but whether the
exercise of that appointment violated the rule against
perpetuities."
The Lamkin case further emphasizes the well-settled
law that for the purpose of determining whether the effect
of an appointment under a power violates the rule against
perpetuities, the court ordinarily measures the period with-
in which the estate must vest as twenty-one years after a
life or lives in being (and the usual period of gestation)
from the death of the donor whose will created the original
0 Supra, n. 84, 708.
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power. An exception to the rule that the maximum period
within which an estate must vest is to be calculated from
the date of the creation of the power, is where a person
creates a trust during his lifetime over which he retains
complete control with a power to revoke it and thereby
destroy it. Such "destructibility" of the future estate will
so effect the application of the rule against perpetuities
that the period within which a future interest must vest is
in that instance calculated from the death of the settlor
rather than from the date of the execution of the trust
document. The court held that this exception did not apply
in the case at bar.
In the Lamkin case, in which the court held that the
exercise of the power before it did not violate the rule
against perpetuities, the court mentions with approval
Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, stating the three rules
for the determination of the question as to whether a testa-
mentary power of appointment violates the rule against
perpetuities, as follows: 7
"In this connection, Gray, The Rule Against Per-
petuities, 4th Ed., Sec. 473, lays down three rules for
the determination of the question whether a testamen-
tary power of appointment violates the rules against
perpetuities. One of these is that if the power itself
can be exercised at a time beyond the limits of the rule,
it is bad. A second is that a power which cannot be
exercised beyond the limits of the rule is not rendered
bad by the fact that within its terms an appointment
might be made which would be too remote. The third
rule is that the remoteness of an appointment depends
on its distance from the creation, and not from the
exercise, of the power. See also Miller on Construction
of Wills, Sec. 330. Under these rules the power itself
must be exercised within the period counting from the
death of the original testator, but the possibility of a
subsequent void appointment does not invalidate the
power."
Ryan v. Ward88 is of especial interest as holding that a
power retained in the creator of a trust over an estate of
Ibid., 709-710.
0 64 A. 2d 258 (1949).
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about $32,500.00 in value, to invade principal to the extent
of $1,500.00 a year - the right being non-cumulative if not
exercised in any one year - does not reserve such a degree
of power as is regarded sufficient to hold the trust estate
to be "destructible" by its creator at a time before his death.
Therefore, the court held that the rule against perpetuities
was to be measured from the date of the execution of the
trust instrument and not, under the recognized exception
of the rule, from the date of the settlor's death. The opinion
in this case presents a thorough review of the Maryland
authorities with respect to the rule against perpetuities,
its operation, interpretation and effect in determining the
validity of future estates, and quotes with approval Restate-
ment, Property, Sec. 373. It is a case of first impression in-
sofar as it deals with the effect of a limited power of with-
drawal of a portion of principal at intervals over a period
of years. The application of the rule against perpetuities
in this case resulted in the holding that certain of the
remainders were void. The case also involved a determina-
tion that certain remainders were remainders to a class,
and void under the rule that even though the gift might
be good as to some members of the class, if void as to others
it is void as to all. The court cannot split into portions such
a class gift. Nor could the appellate court sustain the lower
court in its view that the gift was not one to a single class
but to three separate classes.8 9
The court cites the Reese case9 ° as one in which the court
found that the ultimate remainders did not violate the rule
against perpetuities. And in the same discussion the court
says of the Evans9 case, "... we discussed at length the
general subject of class gifts, but found it unnecessary to
decide whether in that case the gift was to a class or to
designated individuals who were at the date of the deed
the only living children of the grantor".2
1 See also: Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., 188 Md. 178, 52 A. 2d 100
(1947).
Supra, n. 47.01Supra, n. 8.
"Supra, n. 88, 266.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
B. Distribution Directly To Current Beneficiaries
As in the decision in Perkins v. Iglehart,9 3 and a number
of other recent cases, the court in Ryan v. Ward,94 held it
unnecessary to distribute to, and administer the resulting
reversions through the estate of the original testator, and
approved distribution directly by the trustee in the case
before it to the persons or estates having the rights to the
future interests, which had become vested or possessory,
and hence then distributable.95
C. Presumption Against Intestacy: The Most Important
Rule Of Construction
The case of Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co. 6 is also
notable as showing the strength of the presumption against
intestacy as a rule of construction. The court held that the
remainders which it found void as violating the rule against
perpetuities were picked up and disposed of by the resid-
uary clause of the testatrix's will, even though her will,
in disposing of her own estate, contained the words "except
the trust estate which will be disposed of ... by the deed
of trust". The case is significant for another reason: In
construing the deed of trust which this testatrix had exe-
cuted the court referred, in ascertaining the intention of the
settlor, to the preamble of the deed, and said that the specific
declaration of intention therein set forth "may be taken
to limit the general designation of nephews and nieces....
All of the language in the deed should be given effect where
possible." The presence of a residuary clause in the will
strengthens the presumption against intestacy.
D. Property Passing Under Power Of Appointment
Passes From Donor
In Connor v. O'Hara,97 the court held, consistent with
the aforementioned well-settled rules as to the nature and
Supra, n. 3.
" Supra, n. 88.
1 Accord, Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., supra, n. 89.
96Ibid.
9 Supra, n. 85.
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effect of general powers of appointment in Maryland, that
property passing by the exercise of a testamentary power
of appointment is to be regarded, for the purposes of deter-
mining the incidence of the Maryland inheritance taxes,
as also for other purposes, as property passing to the bene-
ficiaries from the donor and not from the donee. On this
point the court overruled the lower court. In the course of
its opinion the appellate court said: "In legislation and in
the opinions of this court property passing under a power
of appointment has been considered like contingent remain-
ders."' The law relating to the incidence of the Mary-
land inheritance tax on property passing under powers of
appointment as summarized in the Restatement, Property,
is regarded by the court as in conflict with its interpreta-
tion of the Maryland law. The court says: "As the American
Law Institute states its construction of the Maryland stat-
ute, without its reasons (Restatement, Property, sec. 333,
Note c) we can only say that we are unable to concur in
that construction."99 Thus the court adhered to the rule
that property disposed of by a donee of a power of appoint-
ment is the property of the donor. The court held that the
donee cannot effectively by an irrevocable contract bind
himself to execute an irrevocable will exercising the power
only in the terms agreed upon. If he enters into such an
agreement and later changes his will exercising the power
in a different manner, but within the scope of the power
as granted, the aggrieved parties after his death have no
remedy in equity against those who took as appointees.
Whether there is a remedy at law against the donee's estate
is a matter which was not before the court.
THE ADoPTED CHILD
The second main point decided in Connor v. O'Hara1°°-
and there had been no prior decision on this point by the
Maryland court - was that for purposes of Maryland in-





child is to be regarded as a lineal descendant of the adoptive
parent.
The "adopted child" played a part in Staley v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Company. 10 The lower court held that
under a trust created by an Illinois resident, to be inter-
preted by Illinois law, a child adopted after the creation
of the trust by a son of the settlor, who was a beneficiary
of the trust, was not to be regarded, in interpreting the in-
tent and the meaning of the trust settlor, as a "child" of
the settlor's son. The appellate court did not differ with
the lower court on this point, but dismissed the case as
one not appropriate for consideration under the Maryland
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act' 02 at the time the case
was instituted, to determine the rights of the adopted child
and other beneficiaries, some of whom were probably as
yet unborn, 03 particularly where those rights would have
to be determined by the Maryland court by interpreting
and applying Illinois law to an issue to which the Illinois
Appellate court had not yet addressed itself.
"CImLDREN" As INCLUDING GANDcHLDREN
The case of Ryan v. Herbert,0 4 is authority for the fact
that in construing particular terms of a particular will the
word "children" may include "grandchildren", and the use
of the term "issue" may be construed as meaning "children
and grandchildren", or, in substance, "descendants, per
stirpes". Both by rules of construction and the rule of law
that a statute is not to be given retroactive effect in the
absence of express provision to the contrary, it has been
held'05 that the term "child" does not include an adopted
child under the terms of a will which took effect before the
adoption statute of 1892.
-0189 Md. 447, 56 A. 2d 144 (1947).
10 Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 31A.
20 As to representation of unborn persons see Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art.
16, Sec. 252A.
186 Md. 453, 47 A. 2d 360 (1946).
"'Fisher v. Wagner, supra, n. 22. See also Eureka Life Insurance Co. v.
Gels, 121 Md. 196, 88 A. 158 (1913) ; Emerson v. Alexander (Circuit Court
No. 2 of Baltimore City), Daily Record (Baltimore) April 18, 1949: Stra-
horn, Change8 Made By The New Adoption Law, 10 Md. L. Rev. 20 (1949).
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"FAmuRE OF IssuE": DEFINITE OR INDEFINTE?
Ridgely v. Pfingstag,10 6 is a case in which the court ex-
presses the hope that it may mark the termination of more
than sixty years of litigation involving the estate created
by the will of William Heald, who died in 1868. It is a con-
tinuation of litigation that was before the Court in Heald
v. Heald0 7 in 1881. It confirms the view that, as decided
in the former case, the will provided for survivorship of
accrued shares within one or more classes of beneficiaries,
respectively, and not between the respective classes. It
held further that reversions, resulting from the failure of
the testator to make a complete disposition of his estate,
descended not subject to the limitation of the rule of seisin,
and that estoppel and limitations barred the claims of bene-
ficiaries against a trustee, which existed more than three
years prior to the institution of suit to enforce them. The
case brings to mind the fact that estates which are still in
course of devolution today may be affected by rules of
law and interpretation long since changed by statute in
Maryland, for it was not until the Act of 1862108 as to wills,
and the Act of 188619 as to deeds, that the words "die with-
out issue" were given the meaning of "definite failure of
issue" rather than "indefinite failure of issue", which had
most important consequences in connection with the inter-
pretation of the rule against perpetuities. As recently as
the Evans case,110 involving the interpretation of a deed of
trust executed in 1859, and a will which became effective in
1873, the court mentioned the possibility that the provisions
of the trust deed, antedating, as it did, the effective date of
the 1886 statute, might well have caused a resulting in-
testacy; however, the court found it unnecessary to decide
the point.
Even under the present statutes interpreting the words
"failure of issue" as meaning a definite failure of all issue
'188 Md. 209, 50 A. 2d 578 (1946).
"'56 Md. 300 (1881).
" Md. Code (1939), Art. 93, See. 347.
19 Md. Code (1939), Art. 21, Sec. 108.
2
1 Supra, n. 8.
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at the time of the death of the person whose issue are meant,
the meaning of "issue", wholly apart from the effect of any
statute, may, in the construction of a particular will, be
held to carry the meaning intended by the testator as,
for instance, "issue, per stirpes", so as to include "grand-
children", although specific reference is made merely to
"children". The word "issue" ordinarily is interpreted as
meaning "children". This was the conclusion in Ryan v.
Herbert,"' in which the Court, in a proceeding under the
Declaratory Judgment Act again applied the rule of con-
struction that had been applied in Hammond v. Piper,"2
that where one of two constructions would result in an in-
testacy the court will adopt the construction which will
avoid intestacy. On the second point involved in this case
the court held that the "issue" of a deceased child (life
tenant) took at their parent's death, vested life estates in
place of the parent - that is - life estates measured, not
by their own lives, but by the period during which the trust
under the terms of the will would continue to exist. Such
vested life estates, the court held, could have been disposed
of by assignment or by will, or descent in intestacy. "Life
estates", said the court, "have sometimes been enlarged by
the courts, but we are aware of no case in which an estate,
absolute by the terms of the gift, has been whittled down
by judicial construction to become only a life estate. '
SPENDTRIFr TRusTs: ATTAcinMENT To SATISFY
ALIMONY CLAIMS OR OTHER DEBTS
It has not been the primary purpose of this study to
digest the facts of all of the recent cases relating to con-
struction of wills, but to give special attention to the rules
of law relating to the. devolution of future interests as they
appear today. However, one group of the recent decisions
deserves attention from both standpoints. These decisions
relate to the extent to which a future interest controlled by
a spendthrift trust provision can be reached to satisfy a
I Supra, n. 104.
Supra, n. 8.
l Supra, n. 104, 462.
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wife's claim for alimony. In Safe Deposit & Trust Company
v. Robertson"' the Court held that if such a claim is based
upon a court decree for alimony it will be sustained. In two
subsequent cases, each entitled Hitchens v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Company, both decided the same day,"5 the court
held that where such a decree had not been obtained and
the claim was merely based upon a separation agreement
providing for "permanent alimony" the future interest
could not be reached by way of a non-resident attachment
nor by way of a petition in equity brought by the trustee
for the construction of the will and court direction in dis-
tribution. The only other situation in which the interest
of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust can be reached by
a creditor is the one in which a tax lien held by the United
States is enforceable." 6
BANi uwrcy
All future interests which are subject to alienation pass
under the Bankruptcy Act to a trustee in bankruptcy."7
The Act provides: "The Trustee ... shall. .. be vested by
operation of law with the title of the bankrupt... to all (7)
contingent remainders, executory devises and limitations,
rights of entry for condition broken, rights or possibilities
of reverter, and like interests in real property, which were
non-assignable prior to bankruptcy, and which, within six
months thereafter, become assignable interests or estates
or give rise to powers in the bankrupt to acquire assignable
interests or estates .. ."1 8 Most, but not all, vested future
estates which are not subject to the limitations of a spend-
thrift trust provision, can be subjected to involuntary alien-
ation, but the Maryland court has declined in at least one
instance to permit a judgment creditor to reach a vested
interest in a contingent remainder on the ground of result-
ing disproportionate hardship to the owner and dispropor-
65 A. 2d 292 (1949).
"66 A. 2d 93 (1949) ; 66 A. 2d 97 (1949).
"' Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp. 701, 704 (D. C. Md.
1944).
11 U. S. C. (1946), Sec. 110a (7).
uO Ibid.
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tionate benefit to the creditor. The economic "destructi-
bility" of a future estate so uncertain in value and marketa-
bility should be given great weight."9
While it is true that the rule analogous to the rule of
seisin, and the rule of seisin itself, both operate in the same
manner to control the devolution and descent of future
interests which they affect, whether the assets comprising
the estates consist of real estate or personal property, never-
theless, the persons who ultimately receive in possession
the property upon distribution, may be affected in the
respective amounts or portions of the estate which they
receive, by the nature of the assets themselves. Thus, if a
remainder after a life estate is devised by a will which
became effective in 1891, to a named person or (by way of
substitution expressly provided in the original will) to "his
heirs" should he have died during the lifetime of the life
tenant, a widow of the deceased remainderman may take in
distribution her statutory share of personal property con-
stituting the remainder when it vests; but not being an
"heir" in the sense of one who, under the statute law then
in force, could inherit real estate from her deceased hus-
band, she could not under the rules of construction applied,
take a share in the real estate. This the court held in Shriver
v. Shriver."2 O
CONCLUSION
In the field of law relating to wills the rule of stare
decisis is of little help. The Maryland Court of Appeals,
during the course of a recent opinion relating to the selec-
tion of jurymen"I remarked: "Of course, in drawing jurors
or selecting a jury, brothers ought not to be treated like
u9Armiger v. Reitz, 91 Md. 334, 341, 342, 46 A. 990, 991 (1900). And see:
Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Indep. Brewing Assoc., 127 Md. 463, 96 A.
617 (1916) ; see also Myerberg, Maryland Ezamnne8 The Propo8ed Uniform
Property Act, supra, n. 49, 21.
'°127 Md. 486, 96 A. 615 (1914). No question of devolution of the future
interest, from a deceased remainderman, was involved in this case.
In Young v. Lynch, 69 A. 2d 787, 788 (1949).
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fungible goods." The same "principle" is even more appli-
cable to wills. It still remains true, as Judge Offutt re-
marked in Stahl v. Emery122 that: "No will has a twin
brother".'23 This is particularly true with reference to the
rules of construction of wills, as distinct from rules of law
marking the course of devolution and descent of future
interests. The two classes of rules are not wholly distinct
and separate. Especially is this so as to class gifts. Through
the haze of the myriad decisions there is, in the more recent
opinions, an increasing indication that the court does not
lose sight of those twin fundamental objectives of the law-
certainty and equitable justice. Maryland is not in the
minority with respect to its interpretation and application
of the rules of law relating to contingent class gifts, but
even occasional "liberal" application of those rules cannot
disburse the harsh results that may frequently occur by
reason of the condition of survivorship.
Legislative action might reduce such hardship, but it is
not a certainty that such a course would bring unmitigated
benefits. It is still true that a good draftsman of a will can
always minimize the risks of unfortunate litigation and the
resultant expense and delays involving future estates. The
man who draws his own will is, from one standpoint, "the
lawyer's best friend". But the testator's best friend, if he
can but realize it, is an able lawyer.
THE KING Is DEAD! LONG LIVE THE KING! This would
seem to be the epitaph which the Court of Appeals and the
Legislature is writing for the tomb of SEasINA FAcrr STmpi-
TEm. But the corpse is not yet buried. The ghost's realm
of wandering continues to be more and more restricted.
When the reason for a rule is gone the rule itself must fail.2 '
"Persistence in error under the shadow of a great name still
calls that right - that is recognized to be wrong. Can the
- 147 Md. 123, 127 A. 760 (1925).
- See also Elder v. Lantz.- 49 Md. 186 (1878) ; Henderson v. Henderson,
64 Md. 185, 189, 1 A. 72 (1885) ; Marshall v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company,
101 Md. 1, 60 A. 476 (1905) ; Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Company, 180 Md.
336, 339, 24 A. 2d 299 (1942) ; Judik v. Travers, 184 Md. 215, 221, 40 A. 2d
206 (1944).
f Hammond v. Piper, suapra, n. 8.
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faulty structure stand, now that the foundation stone has
been removed?"'12
Today-
The rule of seisin does not affect the devolution or de-
scent of reversions, legal and equitable, and vested remain-
ders, irrespective of the date of their origin.
Contingent remainders continue to devolve and descend,
subject to the rule of seisin, if created by a will or trust
instrument effective before the effective date of the Act of
1916126 changing the order of descent. If created after that
date they devolve and descend free of the effect of the rule.
Contingent remainders could, before the 1908 Wills Act,'27
be transmitted by the will of the contingent remainderman
himself, and the same thing is true since that Act and irre-
spective of the time when such remainders were created.
A contingent remainder of which the remainderman dies
intestate descends subject to the rule of seisin, excluding
intermediate heirs if the remainder was created before the
Act of 1916; but if created since that Act the rule of seisin
does not apply. Descent and devolution of an executory
devise is the same as that of a contingent remainder to a
designated person, although none of the "recent" Maryland
appellate decisions have involved issues that were decided,
relating to the descent or devolution of such a future estate.
Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on condition
broken can be willed by any proprietor who dies subsequent
to the effective date of the 1908 Wills Act (if the Court's
dicta stand unchallenged), irrespective of the date when
the future interest came into existence with respect to the
1916 Act changing the order of descents. Those created
before the 1916 Act cannot pass by inter vivos alienation.
If they came into existence before the effective date of the
1916 Act, and if they are not transmitted by the will of an
intermediate heir, they descend in intestacy subject to the
rule of seisin, without power in the intermediate heir to
cast descent in intestacy; otherwise, if they originated since
'Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, 68A. 325, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1197 (1907).
Supra., n. 6; circa, n. 35.
'
27Supra, n. 5; circa, n. 35.
[VOL. XI
1950] FUTURE INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS 241
the passage of that Act. The rule against perpetuities does
not apply to them whenever they came into existence.
Class gifts were not affected by the Wills Act of 1908,
nor by the 1916 Act changing the order of descents. The
court's recent decisions have not changed the rules of con-
struction and law relating to them. A contingent bene-
ficiary of a contingent class remainder still has merely a
possibility of an estate,-not even a "vested interest in a con-
tingent remainder" which his first cousin-the designated
contingent remainderman-holds, subject to divestment.
Judge Markell recently, in a vigorous dissent, decried a
decision by the majority of the court in a negligence case,
with the observation that though the street car seems to be
on its way out, it would be a pity not to give the street-
crossing pedestrian seeking escape from a safety zone, a
fair chance to avoid extinction. 2 ' Such sympathy should
scarcely be extended to the rule of seisin. Maryland has
been alone in its retention of the rule. "Sometimes a rule
of law survives after the reason for it has gone."' 29 Justice
Cardozo once said of the development of a legal rule- 3 '
"There is need of many a supplementary gloss before the
outline can be so filled in as to depict the classic doctrine....
The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate
themselves in the law as the whole truths of another, when
constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, taken
once for granted, are disregarded or forgotten." Seisina
Facit Stirpitem is perhaps no exception.
At the footstone of the grave of the RULE OF SEISIN there
might well be placed the legend written upon the record of
the Court through its quotation 131 of Mr. Justice Story:
"'It is for the public interest and policy to make an end to
litigation....
'THAT Surrs MAY NOT BE IMMORTAL WHILE
MEN ARE MORTAL!'"
' State v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 71 A. 2d 435, 439, 442 (1950).
Fisher v. Chadwick et al., 4 Wyo. 379, 62 Am. St. Rep. 38 (1893).
'® Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown,
246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173, 57 A. L. R. 980 (1927).
Ridgely v. Pfingstag, supra, n. 106, 238.
